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I. INTRODUCTION
As technology continues to advance over time, the frequency of
cyberattacks carried out against the United States has increased. The
United States' economy and its people can only be protected through an
* University of Miami, J.D. Candidate May 2017, University of Miami, M.B.A.
Candidate May 2017. A special thank you to both Ted Chakos (J.D. Candidate May
2016, University of Miami School of Law) and Professor Rachel Stabler for all their
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Act that adequately addresses each of the following elements: Liability,
Information Dissemination, Privacy Rights, Critical Infrastructure, Small
Businesses, and Advancing Technology. While the Cybersecurity Act of
2015 sufficiently addresses liability, information dissemination, and
privacy rights, it fails to adequately protect both critical infrastructure
and small business and fails to create a platform to continue the
advancement of cybersecurity technology.'
In May 2015, foreign adversaries carried out a cyberattack against
the United States.2 This cyberattack, if successful, could have both
destabilized the nation's economy and compromised the personal
3information of many United States citizens. To the surprise of many,
this China-based cyberattack was not the first of its kind.
Many terrorist organizations and foreign adversaries consistently
target the U.S. To many, our nation's economy is the strongest in the
world. The United States' Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which
measures the productivity of a nation's economy, was $17.419 trillion in
2014.4 China had the next closest GDP at $10.354 trillion. The
economies of Germany and the United Kingdom are arguable
competitive with GDPs of $3.868 trillion and $2.988 trillion
respectively.6 Nevertheless, the nation with the strongest economy has
the strongest influence across the global sphere. The U.S. having the
highest GDP creates incentives for others to target its economy and its
citizens through cyberattacks.
Today, our nation is being attacked on a newly developed cyber
battlefield that contains some of the most advanced, complex weapons in
history. Not only does our nation's cybersecurity technology struggle to
combat cyberattacks, but also these cyberattacks can be carried out with
limited resources. The ability to carry out these cyberattacks with limited
resources exposes our country to additional enemies.
The critical infrastructure of this country is the backbone of our
nation's economy. Critical infrastructure is broadly construed as any
entity or information system that directly impacts the daily functionality
I H.R. 2029, 114 th Cong (2015) (designated as Pub. L. No. 114-113).
2 Lisa Brownlee, New Report of Malicious Chinese Cyber Attack on A U.S.
Government Agency, FORBES (Dec. 30, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/lisabrownlee/2015/09/25/new-report-of-malicious-chinese-cyber-attack-on-a-u-s-
government-agency/#2715e4857a0b7f515ae9309b.
3 Id.
4 The World Bank Group, GDP at Market Prices, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (Last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
5 Id.
6 Id.
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of financial businesses and utility services.' If one of these entities or
information systems were hacked and became inoperable, the nation's
economy would be severely weakened. Such an impact on our economy
could result in an economic panic. While an economic panic could be
subdued through quick decision-making, any period of economic
weakness could allow existing adversaries, such as China, to gain a
foothold in the global sphere.
Moreover, one of the most valuable assets to any individual is that
individual's identity. The ability to obtain a legal identity allows an
individual to independently create wealth. However, in modem day
society, businesses create efficiencies within their services through
utilizing information technology systems.' When these information
technology systems are used, the personal information of consumers is
stored on information systems, which in turn are stored in a cyber
platform. 9 As a result, hackers are able to steal such information in order
to gain access to an individual's accumulated wealth.'o To protect against
the stealing of consumer information, our nation must strengthen the
cybersecurity of its businesses.
Our government must find a means to prevent any major cyberattack
from effectively compromising either our economy or our citizens'
personal information. The government can reduce the impact of
cyberattacks by increasing the effectiveness of our nation's
cybersecurity. Cybersecurity can be strengthened through cyber
information sharing between non-federal entities themselves and
between non-federal and federal entities. On December 18, 2015,
President Obama signed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (the 'Act'). The
Act allows non-federal entities to voluntarily share cyber information
between themselves and to voluntarily share cyber information with the
government."
II. HISTORY
With the development of technology, an increasing number of
entities are storing their internal information in a virtual platform. This
platform, called cyberspace, was created through the advancement of
See generally WHAT IS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE?, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY
(Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure.
8 Bert Markgraf, How Is a Management Information System Useful in Companies?,
Demand Media, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/management-information-system-useful-
companies-63415.html (last visited March 13, 2016); see also infra note 11.
9 See generally infra note 12.
to See generally infra note 12.
" Cybersecurity Act of 2015.
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technology and allows various entities to create efficiencies in their
operations that in turn results in increased profitability. As a result,
entities utilizing cyberspace are more exposed to cyberattacks from
United States adversaries. In particular, motivated hackers have targeted
the financial industry, the retail industry, the health care industry, and the
United States government itself.
Before the United States can strengthen its cybersecurity it must first
understand the technology used by modem businesses and agencies.
Today entities rely on information systems to create internal efficiencies
and increase productivity. An information system is "a computer system
or set of components for collecting, creating, storing, processing, and
distributing information, typically including hardware and software,
system users, and the data itself."1 2 Using information systems, an entity
stores various amounts of information in cyberspace, which exposes
stored information to cyberattacks. The exposure entities face when
storing data in cyberspace has created an entirely new global
battlefield.1 3 "Cyberspace is the new battleground, a battleground for a
multitude of adversaries. Foreign nations, international terrorist
organizations and organized crime regularly target our citizens,
businesses, and government."1 4 The amount of potential adversaries to
the United States has grown significantly as a result of critical
information being stored on cyberspace.
Additionally, enemies are able to carry out large-scale cyberattacks
with limited resources. "Unlike traditional combat operations,
cyberattacks don't require sophisticated weaponry to carry out their
warfare. On the cyber battlefield, a single individual with a laptop
computer can wreak havoc on business, the economy, and even our
critical infrastructure."" Since a hacker is able to conduct cyberattacks
with relative ease, it is imperative that our nation develops stronger
cybersecurity.
Moreover, the United States has the largest Mutual Fund and
Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) Markets within the world.1 6 Mutual Funds
and ETFs are financial entities that conduct investment strategies to
accrue profitable gains. '7 At the 2014 year-end, the U.S. Mutual Fund
12 Information System Definition, business dictionary, http://www.business
dictionary.com/definition/information-system.html.
13 161 Cong. Rec. H2426 (daily ed. April 23, 2015) (statement of Rep. Loudermilk),
https://www.congress.gov/amendment/ 114th-congress/house-amendment/99/text.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 2015 Investment Company Fact Book, Investment Company Institute (Nov. 16,
2015, 5:00 PM), www.icifactbook.org/fb chl.html.
17 Id.
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and ETF assets accounted for 53% of the $33.4 trillion Mutual Fund and
ETF assets worldwide. A hacker wishing to steal from these entities
can do so through successfully hacking into the platform on which these
entities run their operations and trading systems. A hacker could even
profit by conducting a cyberattack that halts the operations of one of
these financial entities, allowing that hacker to execute profitable trades
against the open trading positions of a particular financial entity. The
ability to achieve large sums of monetary assets in little time with limited
resources can incentivize many to carry out cyberattacks against our
nation.
In July through August of 2014, a "series of coordinated,
sophisticated attacks" on JPMorgan Chase siphoned off gigabytes of
data.' 9 The hackers were able to steal account information of 83 million
households and small businesses. 20 However, JPMorgan Chase found no
evidence of fraud or misuse of customer information in the following
months. 2 ' Even though Hackers stole information that included customer
email addresses, home addresses, and phone numbers,2 2 the success of
this cyberattack was prevented through JPMorgan Chase's cybersecurity.
Nevertheless, on Friday March 25, 2016, U.S. Officials announced seven
Iranian hackers were able to coordinate a cyberattack on multiple U.S.
banks, such as JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo, resulting in the loss of
* * * *23
millions in business.
In comparison to the financial industry, hackers have targeted the
retail industry, which collects large quantities of financial information
from individual consumers. In December 2013, Target Corporation's
information system incurred one of the largest data breaches to date. 24
Hackers carried out a cyberattack that resulted in the theft of credit and
debit card records of more than 40 million customers,2 5 while gaining
access to personal information, such as email and mailing addresses, for
18 Id.
19 Kevin Granville, 9 Recent Cyberattacks Against Big Businesses, The N. Y. TIMES
(Dec. 29, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/02/05/technology
/recent-cyberattacks.html?_r=0].
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Dustin Volz and Jim Finkle, U.S. indicts Iranians for hacking dozens of banks, New
York dam, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2016, 11:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
iran-cyber-idUSKCNOWQ1JF.
24 Kevin Granville, 9 Recent Cyberattacks Against Big Businesses, The N. Y. TIMES
(Dec. 29, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/02/05/technology/
recent-cyberattacks.html? r-0].
25 Id.
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more than 70 million people.26 The data breach was executed through
malware that was installed on Target Corporation's network.27 The
executed malware enabled the hackers to gain access to customer
information by siphoning away such information through customer
orders and purchases, compromising the financial assets of millions of
citizens.
Similarly, our nation's healthcare industry entities collect large
quantities of personal information while operating profitable businesses.
"The U.S. insurance industry's net premiums written totaled $1.1 trillion
in 2014, with premiums recorded by life/health insurers accounting for
56 percent and premiums by property/casualty insurers accounting for 44
percent." 28 In February 2015, a cyberattack targeted Anthem, one of the
nation's largest health insurance providers. 2 9  The cyberattack
compromised personal information of "tens of millions of its customers
and employees." 3 0 The hackers were able to breach a database that stored
information on past and present customers and employees. 3' The stolen
information included "names, Social Security numbers, birthdays,
addresses, email and employment information, including income data." 32
Hackers realized that cyberattacks carried out against the healthcare
industry could prove to be lucrative.
Although, seeking profit is not always a hacker's primary incentive.
For instance, China has targeted the United States to gain an economic
advantage.33 The Chinese economy is the largest emerging market in the
world.34 From 2013 to 2017, China's GDP is forecasted to grow by
45 .9%.35 As the Chinese economy has grown, China's global
competitiveness with the United States has grown as well. China, in the
hopes of becoming more competitive with the United States, has
attempted a series of cyberattacks to try and halt our nation's economy.
26 Id.
27 Id. Malware is short for "malicious software" and "refers to software programs
designed to damage or do unwanted actions on a computer system." See Malware
Definition, TechTerms.com, http://techterms.com/definition/malware (last visited Jan. 31,
2016).
28 Insurance Industry At A Glance, Insurance Information Institute, (Jan. 31, 2015),
http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/industry-overview.
29 Kevin Granville, 9 Recent Cyberattacks Against Big Businesses, The N. Y. TIMES
(Dec. 29, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/02/05/technology/
recent-cyberattacks.html?_r=0].
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See generally Brownlee, supra note 2.
34 The Top 20 Emerging Markets BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2013 4:18 PM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/slideshow/2013-01-30/the-top-20-emerging-markets.html#slide2l.
35 Id.
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In May 2015, China conducted a weeklong cyberattack named Operation
Iron Tiger that targeted United States government contractors.36 The
hackers utilized stolen Office of Personal Management data to infiltrate
the information systems of Government contractors, compromising
terabytes of data from various defense contractors.3 7 This cyberattack
appeared to manipulate stolen Office Personnel Management data in
order to hack targeted cyberspace. 38 A successful Chinese cyberattack
may allow China to gain an economic advantage, or even political
leverage, over the United States.
China has become more strategic in targeting our nation's critical
infrastructure. 3 9 As of February 2014, the National Security Agency
(NSA) has constructed a map displaying where the Chinese government
has carried out massive cyberattacks. 4 0 The map reveals that these cyber
assaults target "all sectors of the U.S. economy, including major firms
like Google and Lockheed Martin, as well as the U.S. government and
military." 4 ' The Chinese cyberattacks have successfully targeted over
600 corporate, private, and governmental entities within a five-year
period.42 These cyberattacks concentrated on America's industrial
centers and stole "corporate and military secrets and data about
America's critical infrastructure, particularly the electrical power and
telecommunications and internet backbone." 4 3 The critical infrastructure
of the U.S. must be protected or else our economy will be at risk.
Understanding and appreciating the capability of our nation's
adversaries is critical to developing effective cybersecurity. In recent
years, cyberattacks have become more focused and have greatly
increased their ability to compromise our citizens' personal information
and to disrupt our economy's productivity. However, technology is
necessary to provide the most effective services to our citizens and to
increase the productivity of our nation. As our nation becomes more
reliant on technology, it is essential that our nation develop a
cybersecurity platform to defend against cyberattacks. We must be one
step ahead of our adversaries on this newly established battlefield:
cyberspace.
36 Brownlee, supra note 2.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Robert Windrem, Secret NSA Map Shows China Attacks on U.S. Targets, NBC
NEWS (Jul. 30, 2015, 6:23 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/exclusive-
secret-nsa-map-shows-china-cyber-attacks-us-targets-n401211.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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III. IDENTIFYING TWO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
Our nation's critical infrastructure is composed of many non-federal
entities. 4 4 Many of these non-federal entities are smaller entities that have
a limited amount of resources. 45 Building a strong cybersecurity platform
requires time and money. However, our nation's critical infrastructure is
only as strong as its weakest link. If one entity within our nation's critical
infrastructure is compromised, the U.S. economy could potentially stall.
On February 12, 2013, President Obama, recognizing the need to provide
these entities with the resources to develop effective cybersecurity,
signed Executive Order 13,636 (Order).46 The Order identifies two
essential elements in improving our nation's cybersecurity: critical
infrastructure and technology. 47
A. Understanding Critical Infrastructure
The success of the United States' critical infrastructure depends on
the functionality of multiple non-federal entities. Because our nation's
critical infrastructure relies on the functionality of multiple entities, our
nation has the potential of diversifying the risk of cyberattacks. In
finance, people diversify their investments to distribute the risk. While
our critical infrastructure has many components, the components rely on
each other for success. Thus, our critical infrastructure is still at great risk
even if only one entity is compromised. As a result, when one entity
begins to perform poorly, all interrelated entities will also begin to
perform poorly. In order to utilize the notion of diversification, each
entity operating in our critical infrastructure must independently have a
strong cybersecurity.
In truth, many of our nation's critical infrastructure entities are
unable to protect themselves due to limited resources. President Obama,
through his Executive Order, identified both the significance of and the
necessity of providing cybersecurity to our nation's critical
infrastructure.4 8 President Obama explains that it is the duty of the
United States to find a means of providing the necessary resources to
critical infrastructure entities. 4 9 "It is the policy of the United States to
enhance the security and resilience of the Nation's critical infrastructure
44 U.S. SMALL BUSINEss ADMINISTRATION, SMALL BUSINEss GDP: UPDATE 2002-2010
(Jan. 2012), https://www.sba.gov/content/small-business-gdp-update-2002-2010.
45 Id.
46 See generally Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-19/pdf/2013-03915.pdf.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 11739.
49 Id.
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and to maintain a cyber environment that encourages efficiency,
innovation, and economic prosperity while promoting safety, security,
business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties."5 0 The President
further suggested that the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure can be
improved through the sharing of information between non-federal and
federal entities.
However, it is essential that our country narrows the definition of
critical infrastructure entities. Defining which entities need immediate
assistance ensures that the proper resources are allocated in a timely and
effective manner. President Obama defined the term critical
infrastructure to mean "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination
of those matters." 52 A risk-based approach was used to identify where a
cybersecurity incident could reasonably result in a detrimental effect on
our nation and identify critical infrastructure entities at greatest risk.53
Identifying the most at-risk entities allows the government to address the
weakest links in the cybersecurity of our critical infrastructure entities.
B. Advancing Technology
President Obama identified a second essential element in creating
stronger cybersecurity: technology.54 The advancement of technology
can ensure that an entity's cyber defense will continue to improve as
cyberattacks become more advanced and complex. The Order attempts to
provide a customizable cybersecurity framework to each entity through a
three-step process: 1. the creation of a cybersecurity framework; 2. the
voluntary sharing of such framework; and 3. the consultation in adopting
such framework. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) was responsible for implementing this three-step process.56
50 Id.
51 Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-19/pdf 2013-03915.pdf.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 11742.
54 Id. at 11741.
5 See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, FRAMEWORK
FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY, (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf
(hereinafter, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY).
56 Id. at 4.
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The cybersecurity framework promotes the ability for entities to
advance their existing technology by remaining "technology neutral.", 7
The NIST relied on existing standards to create a framework that will
continue to develop and grow alongside technological advances." "By
relying on global standards, guidelines, and practices developed,
managed, and updated by industry, the tools and methods available to
achieve the Framework outcomes will scale across boarders,
acknowledge the global nature of cybersecurity risks, and evolve with
technological advances in business requirements."5 9 The framework
provides both a base to develop a cybersecurity platform and a means to
continue technological development within each particular entity.
However, entities will only be willing to adopt the provided
framework if that framework will not disturb the profitability of each
entity. The NIST needed to ensure that economic success could still be
achieved while implementing the developed cybersecurity framework.
The NIST argues that "the use of existing and emerging standards will
enable economies of scale and drive the development of effective
products, services, and practices that meet identified market needs." 6 0
The co-alignment of profitability with the development of a stronger
cybersecurity platform is a very attractive proposition. An entity will not
only be able to continue its level of productivity, but will also be able to
provide adequate protection against cyberattacks.
The ability of an entity to maintain a steady level of productivity
depends on the ability to implement a new cybersecurity framework
smoothly. The NIST framework focused around a multi-layered
implementation process: 1. framework core, 2. framework
implementation tiers, and 3. framework profile.6 ' This three-layered
process allows each entity to customize the NIST framework to fit its
business model, ensuring a smooth transition when adopting this new
cybersecurity platform.
First, the framework core ("core") provides a strategic overview that
will allow organizations to manage cybersecurity concerns effectively.62
The core is composed of five "concurrent and continuous functions:
5 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, FRAMEWORK FOR
IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY, 4 (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf
[hereinafter National Institute of Standards and Technology].
61 Id. at 4-5.
62 Id. at 4.
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Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover." 63 The NIST has
declared these five functions as "a set of cybersecurity activities, desired
outcomes, and applicable references that are common across critical
infrastructure sectors."64 Implementing the framework core will provide
the proper foundation for an organization to continue developing its
cybersecurity platform.6 5
Second, the framework implementation tiers ("tiers") help an
organization identify both its current views on cybersecurity risk
management and the type of process the organization already has in
place.66 The tiers "describe the degree to which an organization's
cybersecurity risk management practices exhibit the characteristics
defined in the framework (e.g., risk and threat aware, repeatable, and
adaptive)."6 7 The tiers allow an organization to quickly assess its current
position in order to implement the most effective cybersecurity platform.
Third, the framework profile ("profile") customizes the
implementation of the framework to suit a particular organization's
business needs. 68 The NIST will provide an entity with a list of
framework categories and subcategories to identify the nature of that
entity's business operations. 6 9 The NIST characterizes the profile as "the
alignment of standards, guidelines, and practices to the framework core
in a particular implementation scenario." 7 0 The profile ensures a smooth
transition in implementing the new cybersecurity framework, allowing
any entity to continue business operations in an effective manner.
The Order promoted the adoption of the cybersecurity framework
through voluntarily offering it to all existing entities.7 It instructed the
Secretary of Homeland Security, along with Sector-Specific Agencies, to
establish a voluntary program to support the adoption of this
framework.72 The program would support the framework's adoption by
any owner and operator of critical infrastructure, as well as all other
interested entities.73
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1.
65 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, FRAMEWORK FOR
IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY, 1 (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf.
66 Id. at 5.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, at 11,741 (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-19/pdf/2013-03915.pdf. [Executive Order].
72 Id.
73 Id. at 11739.
2015-16] 243
244 U. MIAMI NAT'L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV
The Adoption of the framework is not obligatory but is strongly
suggested.74 This allows various entities that do have the ability to create
strong cybersecurity to continue to operate independent frameworks.
These independent frameworks may have a proven track record in
protecting particular entities against cyberattacks. Additionally, the
Order requires agencies responsible for regulating the security of critical
infrastructure to consult with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and National
Security Staff in order to identify and reduce regulatory burdens.
Through reducing regulatory burdens, the government is encouraging
entities to choose among the best resources available. These resources
consist of the framework provided by the NIST that helps individual
non-federal entities develop an independent cybersecurity platform.7 6
Regardless, the Order has ensured that resources will be available should
an entity not have sufficient cybersecurity. However, these resources
primarily consist of structural information on how to build a stronger
cybersecurity platform. The NIST does not provide the actual technology
to develop such a framework. In turn, non-federal entities with financial
limitations may not be able to independently acquire the necessary
technology to develop more effective cybersecurity.
IV. CURRENT LAW
A. Sharing Electronic Information
The various private and public entities existent in our nation will
voluntarily share cyber information only if they can do so without
incurring increased liability. A corporation operating in cyberspace likely
stores a large amount of personal information on its information systems.
Whether this personal information derives from employees or consumers
is not important. The significance lays in the liability a company, or
entity, can face if it exposes personal information to a third-party.
An entity's ability to collect and store data on information systems to
create efficiencies comes with limitations. These limitations are created
under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986.
The ECPA is continuously updated through subsequent legislation,
including the USA Patriot Act, to "keep pace with the evolution of new
74 Id.
Id. at 11,740.
7 See supra NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, note 60.
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22
(1986).
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communications technologies and methods."7 ' As of today, "[t]he ECPA
protects wire, oral, and electronic communications while those
communications are being made, are in transit, and when they are stored
on computers. The Act applies to email, telephone conversations, and
data stored electronically." 7 9 The ECPA identifies the modem
significance of communicating via technology and tries to prevent the
disclosure of private information through using third-party technology.
The ECPA consists of three titles.so The first title constitutes the
Wiretap Act.' The Wiretap Act protects personal communication by
prohibiting "intentional, actual, or attempted interception, use,
disclosure, or procurement of any other person to intercept or endeavor
to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication."8 2 The Wiretap
Act does provide two specific exceptions that allow a electronic
information to be shared. First, a telephone service provider is allowed to
listen or monitor phone calls when either law enforcement officers, who
are acting pursuant to a valid court order, direct the provider, or the
provider's network is being used without having been paid for.83 Second,
law enforcement officials can intercept electronic information if an
individual has consented to the use of that electronic information by third
parties.8 4 There is no liability exception for an entity to voluntarily share
cyber information that contains personal information with either another
non-federal entity or with a federal entity.
The second title of the ECPA is referred to as the Stored
Communications Act (SCA). 5  The SCA protects both personal
information that is stored by service providers and private information
collected as a result of a subscription with the service provider, such as
the subscriber's name, billing records, or IP address. 8 6 The SCA protects
consumers' personal information from misuse by service providers. 7
However, there are two exceptions for divulging private information
78 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES, https://it.ojp.gov/privacyliberty/authorities
/statutes/1285 (last visited Jan 18, 2016, 11:10 AM) (citing Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22).
79 Id.
80 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22 (1986).
81 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1986).
82 Id.
83 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(1986); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1), (5) (1986) (defining
wire communication and providing clarification for electronic communication service as
used in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(1986)).
84 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c)-(d)(1986).
85 18 U.S.C. § 2701-2712 (1986).
86 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1986).
87 Id.
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under the SCA: 1. exception for disclosure of communications; and 2.
exception for disclosure of customer records." To qualify for an
exception the service provider must in good faith, "believe that an
emergency involving danger of death or of serious physical injury to any
person requires disclosure without delay of information relating to the
emergency."8 9 The SCA does provide an avenue for entities to share
information with the government, but limits that avenue to exigent
circumstances.
The third and last title, Title III, requires that government entities
obtain judicial authorization before installing and using a pen register
and/or trap or trace.90 A pen register is a device that captures the dialed
information, information from out going calls, or communications made
by an individual.9' A trap and trace is a device that captures the actual
numbers involved in a telephone call, along with related information of
the outgoing or incoming call.9 2 For judicial authorization to be granted,
the applicant must provide a basis of certification that the information
sought is likely to be relevant to "an ongoing criminal investigation
being conducted by that agency." 9 3 This title directly addresses the
limitations on the government to acquire personal information from non-
federal entities.
Moreover, Title III is necessary to prevent governmental intrusion
into the operations of private entities. However, this puts a burden on the
non-federal entities to voluntarily share information with the government
in order to strengthen our nation's cybersecurity platform. But a non-
federal entity is limited through ECPA and the SCA in terms of what
information can be shared without incurring liability.
B. Sharing Personal Information
1. Statutory Liability
An individual can prevent financial institutions from sharing
personal information through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.94
This Act requires financial institutions to disclose to customers what kind
of private information it will be allowed to share with other entities. 95
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 18 U.S.C. §3121-3127 (1986).
91 18 U.S.C. §3127 (1986).
92 Id.
93 18 U.S.C. §3122 (1986).
94 See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, S. Res. 900, 106th Cong. (1999)
(enacted).
95 Id. at § 502-03.
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Additionally, under certain circumstances, this Act allows customers to
prohibit information sharing with other entities. 96 The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 created barriers for financial institutions to share
personal information that may be existent on relevant cybersecurity
information.
Moreover, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (HIPAA) also contains specific rules requiring entities operating
within the health care industry to protect the information of customers. 97
HIPAA creates a national standard of protection of both medical records
and personal information, which applies to health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and health care provides that conduct transactions
electronically.9 8 "The Rule requires appropriate safeguards to protect the
privacy of personal health information, and sets limits and conditions on
the uses and disclosures that may be made of such information without
patient authorization." 99 If the national standard is not adhered to, an
entity can face a significant fine. As of 2014, the New York and
Presbyterian Hospital (NYP) and Columbia University (CU) both
incurred data breaches resulting in the disclosure of electronic protected
health information of a cumulative 6,800 individuals.' 00 In response,
NYP and CU reached settlements with subsequent civil charges brought
against them for $3,300,000 and $1,500,000 respectively.' 0 '
2. Civil Liability
Additionally, entities storing private information on information
systems in cyberspace can be exposed to civil liability. Usually
individuals whose personal information is compromised through an
entities information systems being breach will bring suit under a
contract-based action.1 02 When individuals elect to utilize the services of
a particular entity, they enter into a contract that requires the entity to
96 Id. § 502.
97 H.I.P.A.A. Enforcement Rule, 45 C.F.R. §160, 164; see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE (2000), http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy
/index.html.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Data breach results in $4.8
million HIPPA settlements, (May 7, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2014/05/07/
data-breach-results-48-million-hipaa-settlements.html.
101 Id.
102 Wayne M. Alder, Data Breaches: Statutory and Civil Liability, and How to Prevent
and Defend a Claim, BECKER & POLIAKOFF ARTICLES, (http://www.becker-
poliakoff.com/data-breaches-prevent-and-defend-a-claim).
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protect personal information.1 03 However, when the contract does not
provide the language for such protection, a plaintiff can argue that "an
'implied contract' exists to safeguard data if such data is collected from
customers or clients.""1 0 4 With the possibility of facing an implied
contract claim, entities storing personal information are likely going to
be exposed to civil suits if a data breach were to be incurred.
V. FUNDAMENTAL INGREDIENTS
The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (the Act), enacted on December 18,
2015, was the legislative branch's first attempt at improving the
cybersecurity of our nation. 0 5 The Act is a combination of three
previously proposed Congressional bills.10 6 The three bills, two proposed
by the House and one by the Senate, were voted on in the 114th
Congress and were respectively titled: the Protecting Cyber Networks
Act (PCNA), H.R. 1560, the National Cybersecurity Protection
Advancement Act of 2015 (NCPAA), H.R. 1731, and the Cyber Security
Information Act of 2015 (CISA), S. 754.107 These three bills were the
essential ingredients of the new 2015 Act and various pieces of each
particular bill exist within the 2015 Act.'0 s The Act directly promotes the
sharing of cybersecurity information among non-federal entities and
between non-federal entities and the government.1 09
To understand the 2015 Act in its entirety, it is important to
understand the various elements that were addressed in drafting such
legislation. The PCNA, NCPAA, and CISA were similar, but each bill
had unique provisions that were ultimately incorporated into the 2015
Act. 110
103 Id.
104 Id. (citing In re Hannaford Bros., 613 F. Supp. 2d (D. Me. 2009)).
105 Cybersecurity Act of 2015, H.R. Con. Res. 2029-3, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted).
1o6 Passage of Landmark Cyber Legislation Likely, COOLEY MEDIA, (12, 17, 2015),
https://www.cooley.com/cyber-legislation-passage-likely.
107 See Protecting Cyber Networks Act, H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill 114th-congress/house-bill/1560; see also National
Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015, H.R. 1731, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill 114th-congress/house-
bill/1731 ?q=%7B%22searcho22%3A%5B%22%5C%22hrl731%5C%22%22%5D%7D
&resultIndex=1; see also Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th
Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill 114th-congress/senate-bilI754.
1os Passage of Landmark Cyber Legislation Likely, COOLEY MEDIA, (12, 17, 2015),
https://www.cooley.com/cyber-legislation-passage-likely.
109 H.R. 2029, 1 1 4 th Cong (2015) (designated as Pub. L. No. 114-113).
110 See H.R. 2029, 1 14th Cong (2015) (designated as Pub. L. No. 114-113).
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A. The PCNA
Through the PCNA, Congress attempted to create a law to strengthen
our country's cybersecurity platform."' The PCNA, sponsored by
Republican Representative Devin Nunes from California, passed the
House on April 22, 2015.112 The PCNA's strengths derive from its
provisions addressing small businesses and the dissemination of
information."'
The PCNA addressed the concern of small businesses being unable
to protect themselves against cyberattacks.1 4 The bill required the Small
Business Association (SBA) to provide assistance to small businesses
and financial institutions." 5 The SBA would help smaller firms monitor
information systems, operate defensive measures, and share and receive
indicators and defensive measures.11 6 Indicators can be broadly defined
as the unique characteristics of each particular cyberattack while
defensive measures consist of various techniques used to build a strong
cybersecurity platform. "1
Additionally, the PCNA attempted to establish a sufficient process to
efficiently disseminate all shared information with the federal
government."' The bill instilled procedures to ensure that cyber threat
indicators shared by a non-federal entity with the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of the
Treasury, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) are shared in
real-time with all appropriate entities.'19 The sharing of information in
real-time would allow the government to fully utilize all shared
information to prevent large-scale cyberattacks against the government.
11 Protecting Cyber Networks Act, H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 114th-congress/house-billI1560.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at §103.
115 Id.
116 Protecting Cyber Networks Act, H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 114th-congress/house-billI1560.
117 Susan Cassidy & Peter Terenzio, Competing Bills Focus on Cybersecurity
Information Sharing But Final Language and Ultimate Passage Remain Unknown,
INSIDE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, (July 10th, 2015), http://www.insidegovemment
contracts.com/2015/07/competing-bills-focus-on-cybersecurity-information-sharing-but-
final-language-and-ultimate-passage-remain-unknown/.
118 Protecting Cyber Networks Act, H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. §102 (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1560.
119 Id. at §104.
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B. The NCPAA
The NCPAA was the second Congressional attempt to provide a
stronger cybersecurity platform for our country.1 20 The NCPAA,
sponsored by Republican Representative Michael McCaul from Texas,
passed the House on April 23, 2015.121 The most notable element of the
NCPAA was its attempt to strengthen the cybersecurity of the federal
government.1 2 2 Non-federal entities will only share cyber information
with the federal government if they are presented with both liability
exclusions and insurance that the federal government has a strong
cybersecurity platform.
The NCPAA provided an effective process that would continue to
develop the core of our federal government cybersecurity.123 The
NCPAA language would have authorized and codified the EINSTEIN
program operated in the DHS.1 2 4 "The EINSTEIN program, as deployed,
makes available the capability to protect the Federal agency information
and information systems.1 2 5  The EINSTEIN program includes
technologies to diagnose, detect, prevent, and mitigate cybersecurity
risks involving Federal information systems."1 26 Representative Michael
McCaul explained that the program, now referred to as the E3A program,
would provide participating Federal agencies with the ability to identify
cyber threats and help protect their systems from internal and external
threats.1 2 7 This protection would ensure that the federal government
could prevent various cyberattacks from compromising the information
shared by non-federal entities.
C. The CISA
The CISA was the Senate's only attempt to draft a bill that would
reinforce our nation's cybersecurity.1 28  The CISA, sponsored by
Republican Senator Richard Burr from North Carolina, passed the Senate
120 National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015, H.R. 1731, 114th
Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-billI1731?q=%/`7B%/`2
2search%/o22%3A%5B%22%5C%22hrl731%5C%22%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=1.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015: Hearing on H.R. 1731
Before the H Comm. on Homeland Security, 114th Cong. 1 (2015) (statement of
Representative Michael McCaul, Member, H. Comm. of Homeland Security),
https://www.congress.gov/amendment/ 114th-congress/house-amendment/99/text.
125 id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill 114th-congress/senate-bilI754.
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on October 27, 2015.129 Although each bill provided provisions to
address the concerns of protecting our country's critical infrastructure,
the CISA provided an additional focus on our nation's health care
industry. 30 "The Department of Health and Human Services must
convene a task force to: (1) plan a single system for the federal
government to share intelligence regarding cybersecurity threats to the
health care industry, and (2) recommend protections for network medical
devices and electronic health records."' 3 ' Entities operating in the
healthcare industry use information systems that store large amounts of
personal information in cyberspace. It is essential that such entities be
provided with the proper resources to fend off cyberattacks.
D. The Key Difference
The PCNA, the NCPAA, and the CISA each had a unique provision,
or provisions, to offer. However, each bill differed greatly in defining
how cyber information would be shared between non-federal entities and
the government. 3 2 The PCNA dictated that information should be shared
with "appropriate federal entities except [the Department of Defense]
DOD" and the procedure governing the sharing would be developed by
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).' 33 The PCNA would also
establish a Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) that
would be located within the DNI.13 4 The CTIIC would serve as "the
primary organization within the federal government for analyzing and
integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States
pertaining to cyber threats." 3 5 The PCNA was the only bill that created a
new organization to process shared cyber information.13 6
In contrast, the CISA specified that information would be shared
with the federal government in real-time. 3 7 The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) would be responsible for developing the real-
129 Id.
130 Id. at §405.
131 Id.
132 Cassidy, supra note 117.
133 Protecting Cyber Networks Act, H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. §104 (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 14th-congress/house-billI1560.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Compare Id. § 104, with Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754,
114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bilI754 and
National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015, H.R. 1731, 114th Cong.
(2015).
137 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. §103. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill 114th-congress/senate-bilI754.
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time process referred to.13 8 Lastly, the NCPAA cited the DHS's National
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) as the
primary clearinghouse for data.1 39 Although the CISA and the NCPAA
both called for information to be shared through the DHS, they addressed
how the DHS would handle shared cyber information differently.1 4 0
The most effective way to disseminate shared information is to
assign the task of sharing such information to one agency. A non-federal
entity is exposing itself to additional risk by sharing cyber information to
the government. Along with additional liability exclusions, a non-federal
entity may be more inclined to share information if it knew that such
information would be fully utilized. As a result, it was essential for the
2015 Act to come to a final decision on how information should be
shared between non-federal and federal entities.
VI. CONSOLDIATED SOLUTION
The United States' non-federal and federal entities are exposed to
cyberattacks everyday. To prevent the impact of cyberattacks our nation
must develop stronger cybersecurity through addressing these essential
elements: Liability, Information Dissemination, Privacy Rights, Critical
Infrastructure, Small Business, and Technology. Understanding the
severity of a successful cyberattacks, Congress enacted the Cybersecurity
Act of 2015.141
The Act is Congress' first successful attempt to provide a basis for
improving the cybersecurity of our country. The Act promotes the
sharing of cybersecurity information between non-federal and federal
entities, as well as between non-federal entities themselves.1 4 2 The
sharing of cyber information will allow our nation to pool resources to
more effectively combat the various cyberattacks carried out against all
entities domiciled in the U.S.
However, the Act does not adequately address all the essential
elements necessary to building a strong cybersecurity platform. While
the Act sufficiently addresses liability, information dissemination, and
privacy rights, it inadequately addresses critical infrastructure, small
business, and technology.
138 Id. § 105.
139 National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015, H.R. 1731, 114th
Cong. §2 (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-billI1731?q=%/`7B
%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22hrl731%5C%22%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=1.
140 Id. at §2; see also Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th
Cong. § 105. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 114th-congress/senate-bill/754.
141 H.R. 2029, 1 1 4 th Cong (2015) (designated as Pub. L. No. 114-113).
142 Id.
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A. Reducing Liability
To encourage non-federal entities to share cyber information both
among each other and with federal entities, the Act must reduce non-
federal entities exposure to both statutory and civil liability. However,
the Act needs to do more than provide liability exclusions to encourage
non-federal entities to share cyber information that may possibly contain
personal information.
For a non-federal entity to understand the liability it will be exposed
to if it were to share cyber information, the Act must adequately define
what type of cyber information can be shared. The Act indicates that
non-federal and federal entities can share two types of cyber information:
1. cyber threat indicators, and 2. defensive measures.1 43 A cyber threat
indicator is generally defined as any information that helps identify a
malicious attempt to infiltrate and appropriate information stored in
cyberspace through exploiting vulnerabilities existent within
cybersecurity.1 4 4 Additionally, a defensive measure is defined as "an
action, device, procedure, signature, technique, or other measure applied
to an information system or information that is stored on, processed by,
or transiting an information system that detects, prevents, or mitigates a
known or suspected cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability."1 4 5
Both cyber threat indicators and defensive measures are defined
broadly.1 46 As a result, it is very likely that non-federal entities will share
information with other entities that contain personal information.
The ability to protect shared cyber information will help reduce the
liability that non-federal entities will be exposed to by sharing such
information. The Act presents a provision that attempts to protect shared
cyber information by strengthening the core cybersecurity platform of
federal entities.1 47 The Act requires the DHS to assess whether or not the
DHS itself can "create an environment for the reduction in cybersecurity
risks in Department data centers, including by increasing
compartmentalization between systems, and providing a mix of security
controls between such compartments."1 48 In comparison, financial
advisors and money manages utilize the concept of compartmentalization
by diversifying the investment strategy of clients' assets. A financial
advisor's diversified investment strategy decreases the overall risk of
loss that a particular client's investments are exposed to. The
143 H.R. 2029, 114 th Cong (2015) (designated as Pub. L. No. 114-113 §105).
144 Id at §102.
145 Id.
146 H.R. 2029, 114 th Cong (2015) (designated as Pub. L. No. 114-113 §102).
147 Id. at §203.
148 Id. at §206.
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government's ability to develop a similar strategy could significantly
reduce the impact of one cyberattack.
For example, if a DHS data center is attacked and its information
system, and thus cyber information, becomes compromised, the stored
shared information existent on other DHS data centers' information
systems will still be protected. The Act's ability to reduce the impact of
cyberattacks on the federal government will in turn reduce the liability
that a non-federal entity will be exposed to by sharing cyber information.
A non-federal entity's liability exposure will be reduced because it will
become less likely for shared cyber information, which may or may not
contain personal information, to become compromised.
As noted above, non-federal entities will also need to be provided
with the proper exclusions from civil liability.1 49 The Act provides
language that directly excludes non-federal entities from civil liability if
they voluntarily share cyber information with each other or with the
government.15 0 Additionally, the Act explains that a non-federal entity
will not waive any privilege or protection when that non-federal entity
decides to share cyber information.1 5 ' Furthermore, when a non-federal
entity decides to share cyber information with the federal government,
that cyber information, being a cyber threat indicator or defensive
measure, will be "considered the commercial, financial, and proprietary
information of such non-federal entity."1 5 2 However, the Act expressly
identifies that to claim cyber information as proprietary, the non-federal
entity must designate that the shared information is proprietary in
nature.1 5 3 The Act has sufficiently reduced the liability a non-federal
entity is exposed to when sharing cyber information.
B. Disseminating Information
A streamlined process for dissemination relevant cybersecurity
information will allow the government to fully utilize shared cyber
information. Furthermore, the shared cyber information will only be
helpful if such information can be analyzed and leveraged to provide
further insight into defending against current and future cyberattacks.
The ability to properly disseminate and to sufficiently utilize shared
cyber information depends on what organization(s) are responsible for
handling this information.
149 Id. at § 106.
150 Id.
151 H.R. 2029, 1 14 th Cong (2015) (designated as Pub. L. No. 114-113 §105).
152 Id. at § 105.
153 Id.
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The strongest method and most effective process for taking
advantage of shared cyber information is for the government to assign
one federal agency as the primary portal for information sharing. The
Act, through amending the Homeland Security Act of 2002, assigns the
DHS as the primary federal entity responsible for collecting, analyzing,
and disseminating shared cyber information by non-federal entities.1 54
Additionally, the Act provides that the DHS will further delegate its
responsibilities for sharing information with multiple DHS data
centers. 5 5 The DHS data centers will allow large quantities of data to be
assessed and leveraged within a shorter period of time. More
importantly, each data center will be focused on conducting analysis of,
and sharing information with, specific industries.1 5 6 This will allow the
government to perform the necessary due diligence before sharing
information with each particular industry.
The DHS must be able to quickly provide beneficial information to
both non-federal and federal entities after analyzing shared cyber
information. Cyberattacks are constantly carried out against non-federal
and federal entities. Additionally, the hackers who carry out these
cyberattacks adapt and alter their approach based on the current
cybersecurity platform of various entities. Therefore, the information
shared by non-federal entities may only be useful for a short period of
time. The Act provides that the Director of National Intelligence, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Attorney General, in consultation with the heads of the appropriate
federal entities, will collaboratively define the proper procedures to
ensure useful information is shared in real-time. 5 7 This team of
individuals will draft procedures that attempt to facilitate the following
aspects of sharing cyber information.5 s First, they will address the
federal government's sharing of classified cyberthreat indicators and
defensive measures with relevant federal and non-federal entities with
adequate security clearance.1 59 Second, they will focus on the federal
government's sharing of declassified cyber threat indicators, defensive
measures, and information related to cybersecurity threat with relevant
non-federal and federal entities.160 Third, they will provide insight on the
federal government's sharing of unclassified cyber information with
relevant federal and non-federal entities, as well as the public in certain
154 H.R. 2029, 1 14 th Cong (2015) (designated as Pub. L. No. 114-113 §105 §204).
155 Id. at §206.
156 Id.
157 H.R. 2029, 1 14 th Cong (2015) (designated as Pub. L. No. 114-113 § 103).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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circumstances. 16 Fourth, they will direct the federal government's
sharing of cyber information that will help entities prevent or mitigate
the adverse effects of cyberattacks with relevant federal and non-federal
entities.1 6 2 Finally, they will concentrate on the federal government's
periodic sharing of developed best practices to improve cybersecurity
with a particular focus on small businesses' ability to access and
implement the best practices.1 6 3 Through real-time processing, the quick
assessment and dissemination of shared cyber information can be
sufficiently conducted through the Act's development of the above
procedures. 164
The federal government must be willing to share its own collected
cyber information with non-federal entities. Non-federal entities will be
more willing to expose their cyber information to the vulnerabilities of
the federal government's cybersecurity only if that federal government is
willing to do the same with non-federal entities. The Act requires, that
when appropriate, the federal government will share cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures with relevant non-federal entities.1 6 5
The Act has created a two-way door for sharing cyber information that
will begin to build a trust between non-federal and federal entities that
will further promote the sharing of cyber information.
C. Protecting Privacy Rights
Non-federal entities will have an exclusion from civil liabilities if
they share their cyber information in accordance with proper procedures.
These procedures ensure that non-federal entities will not expose the
personal information of our nation's citizens unnecessarily. The personal
information of our citizens is their privacy and the Fourth Amendment
ensures that each citizen has a right to his or her own privacy.166 The
federal government must ensure that private information is only shared in
order to prevent hackers from accessing and appropriating this personal
information.
The Act lists basic steps that must be conducted before a non-federal
and federal entity share cyber information. 16 7 The federal government
created these steps to define both what type of cyber information could
be shared and under what circumstances this information could be shared
by non-federal entities. The Act explains that non-federal entities should
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 H.R. 2029, 114 th Cong (2015) (designated as Pub. L. No. 114-113 §103).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
167 H.R. 2029, 114 th Cong (2015) (designated as Pub. L. No. 114-113 §105).
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not share information that "is not directly related to a cybersecurity
threat; and is personal information of a specific individual or information
that identifies a specific individual."1 68 However, non-federal entities
store large amounts of data in cyberspace and it is very likely that a non-
federal entity may unintentionally provide personal information to other
entities. Furthermore, a non-federal entity may only be able to share vital
cyber threat indicators or defensive measures if personal information of
employees or customers is also shared.
Congress understood the necessity of protecting privacy rights when
providing a means for creating a stronger cybersecurity platform through
the sharing of cyber information. The Act requires additional steps to be
taken by the federal government to serve as a precaution to further
protect the personal information of our country's citizens.1 69 The Act
indicates that before sharing a cyber threat indicator, a federal entity
must ensure the cyber threat indicator only contains information directly
related to cybersecurity.17 0 If the federal entity discovers that the cyber
indicator contains information not related to cybersecurity, such as
personal information, it must remove such information.' 7 ' The federal
entity can do this either by reviewing and removing information
contained within a cyberthreat indicator itself, or by implementing a
technical process that focuses on reviewing and removing information.1 7 2
However, non-federal and federal entities may not be able to remove
personal information from all cyber threat indicators in time for
information to be fully utilized. Hackers are able to conduct cyberattacks
in a moment's notice. The DHS and the DHS data centers will be under
pressure to assess and disseminate large quantities of data in a relatively
short period of time. The federal government may unintentionally
provide the personal information as a result of operating under such time
pressures.
Additionally, the federal government must limit the use of shared
cyber information. Limiting non-federal or a federal entity's use of this
information will provide an extra layer of protection to exposed personal
information. The Act provides a set of guidelines to create this additional
layer of protection. First, it creates a process that will destroy personal
information that the federal government is not authorized to utilize. 17
Second, it creates a holding period for shared cyberthreat indicators,
168 Id.
169 Id. § 103 (emphasis added).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 H.R. 2029, 114 th Cong (2015) (designated as Pub. L. No. 114-113 §103).
173 Id. at § 105.
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which can only be retained for the duration of the holding period.1 74
Finally, it includes various requirements that safeguard cyberthreat
indicators that do contain personal information and implements sanctions
against federal agents and employees who act in contravention of the
given guidelines. 7 5  Congress, through adding these guidelines, has
created a multi-layered approach to protecting the personal information
of United States citizens.
However, Congress must define specific circumstances as to when
cyber information can be shared among non-federal and federal entities.
Congress, through defining such circumstances, can safeguard situations
where citizens' personal information could potentially become exposed.
The Act requires that cyber information can only be shared with and
between non-federal and federal entities when that cyber information is
directly related to a cybersecurity risk.17 6 The Act generally defines a
cybersecurity risk as any "threat to or vulnerability of information or
information systems" that can result in "unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, degradation, disruption, modification, or destruction of such
information or information systems.",7 7  Through this definition,
Congress has narrowed the ability of entities to share cyber information
to only circumstances where such sharing is necessary to build a stronger
cyber defense. A stronger cyber defense will provide the means for non-
federal entity to create a stronger cybersecurity platform and increase the
same entity's ability to prevent the success of cyberattacks.
D. Addressing Critical Infrastructure
The United States economy directly relies on our nation's critical
infrastructure. Our nation's critical infrastructure allows various
industries and businesses to maximize their productivity and carry out
necessary tasks. Furthermore, industrial control systems are an essential
piece of critical infrastructure. 7 1 "Industrial control systems are used to
deliver utility services to homes and businesses, add precision and speed
to manufacturing, and process our foods into finished products."1 7 9 For
our economy to function on a daily basis, these control systems need to
be operating effectively and efficiently.
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According to Dell's report on cybersecurity, cyberattacks against
industrial control systems doubled in 2015.180 In comparison, in 2014,
attacks specifically targeting SCADA industrial control systems rose 100
percent from 2013.11 John Gordineer, director of product marketing for
network security at Dell explained: "We have over a million firewalls
sending data to us on a minute-by-minute basis. We anonymize the data
and see interesting trends."'8 2 SCADA stands for Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisitions and "generally refers to control systems that span
a large geographic area, such as a gas pipeline, power transmission
system or water distribution system." 8 3 The Act does not address the
concerns of providing the proper cybersecurity to our nation's industrial
control systems.1 84 This is a significant fault of the Act and further
legislation is needed to provide entities operating these control systems
with the proper resources to mount a defense against cyberattacks.
However, the Act does attempt to build the cybersecurity platform of
our nation's health care industry. The Act strengthens the
cybersecurity platforms of health care industry stakeholders.18 6 A health
care industry stakeholder is defined as any "health plan, health care
clearinghouse, or health care providers; advocate for patients or
consumers; pharmacist; developer or vendor of health information
technology; laboratory; pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturer;
or additional stakeholder the Secretary [of Health and Human Services]
determines necessary."'8 7 The Act requires the government's Secretary
of Health and Human Services to assess the ability of current entities
defined as health care industry stakeholders to defend against
cyberattacks.'
Nevertheless, a health care entity's cybersecurity may prove to be
inadequate against the numerous cyberattacks carried out against the
industry. To further support the cybersecurity of health care entities, the
Act indicates that the Secretary, in consultation with the Director of
National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Secretary of
180 Maria Korolov, Attacks against industrial control systems double, CSO (April 17,
2015 5:47 AM PT), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2911160/cyber-attacks-espionage
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181 Id.
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(May 9, 2012 9:00 PM), https://www.tofinosecurity.com/blog/scada-security-basics-
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Homeland Security, should create a task force that consists of
cybersecurity experts.' 89 This task force will have multiple objectives. 90
First, the task force will analyze how various industries, outside of the
health care industry, have effectively developed cybersecurity.' 9' Second,
it will assess the various challenges that health care entities face when
implementing a sound cybersecurity framework.1 92 Third, it will analyze
the various risks existent when an entity or business associate links a
medical device, or software, to its information systems in order to
effectively utilize health records.1 9 3 Fourth, it will disseminate all
aggregated information to health care industry stakeholders so that they
can immediately improve their cybersecurity and prepare against future
cyberattacks.1 9 4 Finally, it will create an effective plan that will allow the
federal government and the health care industry to collaboratively
combat a cyberattack in real time.19' The task force, following these
objectives, will sufficiently strengthen the cybersecurity of health care
entities. A stronger cybersecurity platform will further protect the
personal information of our citizens.
Our nation's ports are another key element of our economy's critical
infrastructure. A large portion of the United States' import and export
business is run through ports.196 An estimated 360 commercial ports that
provide approximately 3,200 cargo and passenger handling facilities
exist in the United States.1 97 In 2014, 23.1 million employment
opportunities were created through commercial port activities.1 Of
those 23.1 million opportunities, 21.4 were related to an
exporter/importer business and their support industries, contributing
approximately $4.6 trillion to the United States economy and paying an
estimated $321.1 billion in federal, state, and local taxes.' 99 In 2014,
seaport activities individually accounted for $41 billion in federal, state,
and local tax revenues. 20 0 The ports of the United States represent a large
189 Id.
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portion of our nation's GDP.2 0 1 As result of contributing to the success of
the United States economy, these ports have become an essential
component of our country's critical infrastructure. If an adversary to the
United States were able to conduct a series of cyberattacks, similar to
Operation Tiger, against these ports, our country's economy could be
severely damaged.2 02
The United States can protect our nation's ports through providing
the proper cybersecurity resources. The Act requires an appointed Under
Secretary to create a "report on cybersecurity vulnerabilities for the 10
United States ports that the Secretary determines are at greatest risk of a
cybersecurity incident and provide recommendations to mitigate such
vulnerabilities." 203 However, an Under Secretary's recommendations to
the nation's 10 largest ports are not enough to prevent the impact of
large-scale cyberattacks against such ports. Assuming the Under
Secretary's recommendations will be disseminated to all entities
operating on these 10 ports, there will still remain another 350 ports not
being provided with additional cybersecurity support. To help entities
operating in this industry, the government should provide these entities
with a cybersecurity framework similar to that which was developed
under the Order.204 By providing a cybersecurity framework, the
government can ensure that entities have the resources necessary to
implement and develop a more combative cybersecurity platform.
However, the critical infrastructure of the United States consists of
multiple industries and thousands of unique entities. To sufficiently
protect each and every industry, and each and every entity operating
within these industries, the government needs to develop a cohesive plan
to combat cyberattacks. The Act provides that an appointed Under
Secretary will assess the feasibility of producing such a plan.2 05 The
Under Secretary will conduct a report to determine the possibility of
"producing a risk-informed plan to address the risk of multiple
simultaneous cyber incidents affecting critical infrastructure, including
cyber incident that may have a cascading effect on other critical
infrastructure." 20 6 The plan, if created, could provide a much-needed
additional layer of protection to prevent the impact of cyberattacks
against our nation's critical infrastructure.
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E. Addressing Small Businesses
Small businesses are an integral part of the United States economy.
In the first three quarters of 2014 alone, small businesses generated an
estimated 1.4 million new jobs.20 7 However, small businesses generally
have less capital available to invest in their internal infrastructure. This
results in allocating capital into multiple aspects of smaller firms.
Allocating an already limited amount of capital into various parts of a
firm's infrastructure further prevents a smaller firm from being able to
invest heavily in cybersecurity. It then becomes necessary to provide the
proper resources to these smaller entities to help them build and
strengthen their cybersecurity platforms. "In 2014, 31 percent of all
cyberattacks were directed not at large businesses but at businesses with
less than 250 employees. In 2012, the National Cyber Security Alliance
found that 60 percent of small businesses shut down within 6 months of a
data breach." 2 08 While these entities likely shut down due to incurred
litigation fees from civil liability suits as a result of personal information
having been breached, such lawsuits could have been prevented through
stronger cybersecurity. However, the Act does not adequately provide
cybersecurity resources to these entities.
The provision of cybersecurity resources can be established through
developing a cybersecurity framework similar to that developed by the
NIST. 20 9 However, further protection should be provided through the
DHS' assessment and analysis of where small businesses, in general, are
most exposed to a cyberattack. The Act only requires relevant agencies
to pay "attention to accessibility and implementation challenges faced by
small business[es]." 21 0 The Act's provision, as it stands, will not
sufficiently help small businesses develop and implement adequate
cybersecurity.
F. Advancing Technology
Technology allows entities, whether non-federal or federal, to create
operational efficiencies that then result in increased productivity.
However, as all entities rely more on technology, entities store larger
amounts of data on cyberspace. A portion of data that entities store on
cyberspace will ultimately contain the personal information of employees
207 U.S. SMALL BUSINEss ADMIN., SMALL BUSINESS MARKET UPDATE, JUNE 2015, (June
2015), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Small business bulletinJune 2015.pdf.
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NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2015-04-23/
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or customers. Additionally, the essential functionalities of entities will
likely be conducted on information systems that operate on cyberspace.
It is necessary to develop a platform to allow current cybersecurity to
evolve in-line with technological advancements to prevent the impact of
large-scale cyberattacks.
Congress should draft additional legislation that will promote the
continued development of cybersecurity technology. While the Act
focuses on advancing internal defenses of the federal government, no
such provision addresses the important issue of helping non-federal
entities advancing their own internal defenses. 21' The Act directs the
DHS to "continuously diagnose and mitigate cybersecurity risks,
advanced network security tools to improve visibility of network activity,
including through the use of commercial and free or open source tools,
and to detect and mitigate intrusions and anomalous activity." 212
Although it is important to ensure the advancement of the government's
internal defenses, Congress could amend the Act to provide a framework
to non-federal entities that addresses how non-federal entities could
advance their own internal defenses. Through this framework, Congress
could outline in detail, similar to the cybersecurity framework developed
by the NIST, the critical aspects of developing and improving existing
cybersecurity in order to cope with the complexities of new
technology. 213
VII. THE CONTINUED BATTLE
Federal and non-federal entities ability to share critical cybersecurity
information will prove to be beneficial to the United States. Hackers and
foreign nations are continuously carrying out cyberattacks against the
United States; while the Act effectively addresses the elements of
liability, information dissemination, and privacy rights, the elements of
critical infrastructure, small businesses, and technology must be
strengthened.
The United States' cyberspace not only contains our citizens'
personal information, but also provides the ability for businesses to
maximize their productivity. While the Act does require various
appointed Under Secretaries to analyze how to protect multiple aspects
of our economy, the Act does not provide necessary cybersecurity
resources to both non-federal entities within our critical infrastructure
211 Id. at §224.
212 Id.
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and to small businesses.214 Non-federal entities can only build strong
cybersecurity platform if they have access to relevant technology. Large
portions of non-federal entities have the financial resources to acquire
such technology. However, many critical infrastructure entities and small
business entities, due to financial restraints, are unable to acquire
necessary information and technology. Congress should address these
needs by developing and providing a cybersecurity framework, similar to
that developed by the NIST, which will allow entities to access necessary
215technological resources.21 However, unlike the framework NIST
developed, Congress should ensure that the necessary pieces of
technology are available for entities to acquire the necessary technology
to implement the newly developed framework.
The federal government can create a cybersecurity framework
through creating a task force of cybersecurity experts. This particular
task force can develop guidelines and proper steps that non-federal
entities could follow to build a stronger cybersecurity platform.
Additionally, this task force would provide access to technological
resources necessary to build a better cybersecurity platform. However,
the federal government must prevent the public disclosure of this
technology. If hacker and foreign adversaries acquired these
technological building blocks, both could process the information and
conduct cyberattacks that would expose the weakness of the technology.
As a result, the federal government should require an application process
that entities must follow to gain access to cybersecurity technology. An
application process will protect the proprietary nature of the key
components necessary to build, as well as to continuously advance the
technology of a stronger cybersecurity platform.
As the world becomes more technologically reliant, our country's
people and our country's economy become exposed to additional
vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are exposed through the numerous
cyberattacks carried out by both financially motivated hackers and
foreign adversaries of the United States. While President Obama has
signed into force the 2015 Act, the Act does not properly protect critical
infrastructure or small business, and fails to address the need of helping
entities implement and advance cybersecurity technology. 216 Congress
has the ability to strengthen these elements and can and should do so
through following the proper legislative channels.
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